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Court protects secured creditor's self-help remedy
by Michael Foster
In Chrysler Credit Corp. v.
Koontz, 661 N.E.2d 1171 (Iil. App.
Ct. 1996), the Appellate Court for
the Fifth District of Illinois held that
an "unequivocal oral protest" to the
repossession of a debtor's collateral,
without more, does not constitute a
breach of the peace and, thus, does
not preclude awarding a deficiency
judgment to the secured party.
Additionally, the court held that a
creditor's trespass onto a debtor's
property to effectuate repossession
does not result in an automatic
breach of the peace.

Chrysler repossesses
vehicle
In early 1991, Chrysler Credit
Corporation ("Chrysler") notified
James Koontz ("Koontz") of its
intention to repossess his 1988
Plymouth Sundance in the event he
failed to catch up on his monthly car
payments. Koontz's purchase
agreement with Chrysler stipulated
that he was to make sixty monthly
payments in the amount of $185.92.
Responding to Chrysler's notice,
Koontz promised to remedy his
delinquent account, but directed
Chrysler not to enter upon his
private property to repossess the
vehicle. However, on April 21,
1991, Chrysler, pursuant to Illinois'
self-help repossession statute,
instructed the M & M Agency to
repossess the car. The repossessor
proceeded to take the vehicle,
despite Koontz's protesting "don't
take it." Chrysler subsequently sold
the vehicle and filed a complaint,
1996

seeking a deficiency judgment
against Koontz for the balance due
under the sales contract.
Section 9-503 of the Illinois
Commercial Code provides a
secured party, on default, "the right
to take possession of the collateral"
and to "proceed without judicial
process if this can be done without
breach of the peace." 810 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-503 (West
1994). At trial, Koontz contended
that Chrysler's repossession of the
car resulted in a breach of the peace;
thus, the court should deny Chrysler
the benefit of a deficiency judgment.
The trial court found that a breach of
the peace did not occur, and entered
judgment in favor of Chrysler in the
amount of $4,439.92.

Court defines "breach of
the peace"
On appeal, Koontz further
pursued his argument that Chrysler's
repossession of the vehicle breached
the peace. In support of his position,
Koontz cited Dixon v. Ford Credit
Co., 391 N.E.2d 493 (Ill. App. Ct.
1979), in which the court determined that repossession by a
creditor in disregard of the respective debtor's "unequivocal oral
protest... may be found to be in
breach of the peace." Id. at 497.
Koontz contended that Chrysler's
act of ignoring his objection to the
repossession was a breach of the
peace. Chrysler maintained that such
a construction of "breach of the
peace" would profoundly restrict the
proper remedial scope of the self-

help repossession statute. Chrysler
argued that there can be no subsequent breach of the peace without an
element of violence.
The appellate court, noting the
statute's silence regarding the
precise meaning of "breach of the
peace," construed the statute to
mean that conduct which "incites or
is likely to incite immediate public
turbulence" or "leads or is likely to
lead to an immediate loss of public
order and tranquility." Chrysler
Credit Corp., 661 N.E.2d at 1173.
The appellate court rejected
Koontz's proposition that an
unequivocal oral protest could alone
constitute a breach of the peace,
recognizing that such a rule would
allow a debtor to avoid a deficiency
judgment by simply shouting at an
indifferent repossessor. Additionally,
the appellate court explained that
violence is not a prerequisite to a
breach of the peace. A breach of the
peace is sufficient if the conduct
complained of creates a probability
of violence.
Addressing Chrysler's repossession of Koontz's vehicle, the court
held that the trial court did not err in
finding the peace undisturbed. The
court noted that the repossessor did
not respond verbally or physically to
Koontz's protest. Likewise, the court
found no evidence demonstrating
that Koontz entertained or expressed
any violent intentions towards the
repossessor. Koontz's own testimony played a significant role
during the trial. Koontz conceded
that although he was close enough to
respond more forcefully, he reRecent Cases * 285

frained from doing so because he
was in his underwear. Thus, ample
evidence existed to conclude that the
repossession did not result in a
breach of the peace.

Trespass onto debtor's
property is not per se
reach of the peace
Koontz alternatively argued that
Chrysler breached the peace by
repossessing his vehicle in a manner
which constituted criminal trespass
to real property under Section 21-3
of the Illinois Criminal Code. Under
the Criminal Code, criminal trespass
occurs when a person enters upon
the land of another, despite having
received prior notice from that

individual that such entry is forbidden. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/21-3 (West 1994). Prior to the date
of repossession, Koontz informed
Chrysler that it did not have his
permission to enter upon his land;
consequently, he contended that
Chrysler's potentially sanctionable
criminal trespass amounted, at the
very least, to a breach of the peace.
The court found the issue to be
one of first impression in Illinois
and, thus, proceeded to examine the
relevant law from other jurisdictions. The court concluded that a
mere trespass, in and of itself, does
not result in a breach of the peace
because the creditor enjoys a limited
privilege, confined in purpose and in
scope, to enter upon the land of a
debtor. The court instructed that

where the collateral is enclosed in
some fashion, i.e., by fence, gate,
chain, etc., the secured creditor's
privilege is severely diminished,
especially where repossession can
only be accomplished by breaking
down the barriers designed to
exclude potential trespassers.
The court evaluated Chrysler's
entry upon Koontz's real property in
light of these considerations and did
not find a breach of the peace under
the circumstances. Chrysler's entry
was limited to the purpose of
repossession, and there was no
evidence to indicate that any
barricades or enclosures had been
transgressed. Therefore, Chrysler
exercised its privilege lawfully and
the deficiency judgment stands
unaffected.

Banks and lenders violated consumer protection
laws with direct deposit accounts
by Aaron R. Pettit
In Cobb v. Monarch Fin. Corp., 913 F. Supp. 1164
(N.D. III. 1995), the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois held that the owner of a
bank account, to which an allotted portion of the
owner's paycheck was directly deposited and then
immediately transferred to a lender, could state a cause
of action against both the bank and the lender for
violating disclosure requirements of the Electronics
Funds Transfer Act ("EFTA"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1693r
(1988), and for deceptive practices under the Illinois
Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act ("ICFA"),
815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/1-505/12 (1993). The court
also held, however, that the owner of such an account
could not state a cause of action against the bank for
failure to meet disclosure requirements under the Truth

286 e Loyola Consumer Law Reporter

in Savings Act ("TISA"), 12 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4313
(1995), against the lender under the Truth in Lending
Act ("TILA"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667e (1988), and
against both the bank and the lender under the Illinois
Wage Assignment Act ("IWAA"), 740 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 170/.01- 170/11 (1993). Additionally, the court
upheld the plaintiff's claim against the lender that the
loan agreements were unconscionable, but dismissed the
unconscionability claim against the bank.
From November 1993 to November 1994, Verlina
Cobb ("Cobb") obtained a total of ten different loans
from three finance companies ("the lenders"). As
specified in the loan agreements, three banks ("the
banks") created bank accounts in Cobb's name and
electronically and directly deposited an allocated portion
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